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DISCUSSION OF RECENT
RIGHT OF REMAINDERMAN

DECISIONS

IN PROCEEDS OF INSURANCE POICY

SECURED BY LIFE TENANT.-A

bill was filed in equity against

Mamie Louise King and several insurance companies alleging
that the complainant, Charles King, owned a fee in certain real
and personal property as. remainderman, and that the defendant,
Mamie King, owned a life interest in the said property. The bill
further alleged that Mamie King had insured the property for
ten thousand dollars; that the property had been destroyed by fire
which resulted in a loss equal to the amount of the p~olicies; and
that Mamie King was a trustee for the remainderman and should
be required to hold the proceeds of the policy and be allowed
only her life interest therein. The bill prayed that a trustee be
appointed to administer the insurance -fund and that Mamie
King be allowed to rebuild, or that she be allowed interest on the
fund during her lifetime, the fund to be held in trust for the
benefit of the remainderman. A demurrer to the bill was sustained on the ground that there was no equity on the face of the
bill, that it showed no duty on the part of the life tenant to
insure for complainant's benefit. An appeal was prosecuted to
the state supreme court where the decision of the trial court,
sustaining the demurrer, was affirmed. 1
1 King v. King, 163 Miss.' 584, 143 So. 422."
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Briefly, the question before the court was this: What interest,
if any, does a remainderman have in a policy of fire insurance
placed by the life tenant upon property of which the life tenant
was then in possession and which is subsequently destroyed by
fire?
The theory upon which the remainderman's case was based
was that there existed a trust relationship between the parties
with the life tenant as trustee and himself as cestui que trust.
He relied on four cases as authority for his position: Sampson
v. Grogan,2 Green v. Green,3 Welsh v. London Assurance Corporation,4 and Clark v. Leverett.5 The Welsh case was a suit by
life tenant against an insurance company; and though the
opinion of the court contains language favorable to the remainderman, his rights were not before the court, hence the statements are mere obiter dicta.
The case of Clark v. Leverett reviews the other cases cited
by the appellant. In the opinion in that case, the court classifies
the cases under what it calls the Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
and South Carolina rules. The Massachusetts rule is that the
life tenant is not required to use the proceeds of the insurance
on a total loss of buildings insured in his own interest in rebuilding on the premises, and he cannot be held accountable to
the remainderman for such money, even if it amounts to more
than the value of the life tenant's interest and is equal to the
whole value of the property destroyed. The Rhode Island rule
is said to be that if the policy of insurance covers merely the life
tenant's interest, he is entitled to the insurance in full; but if
amount is recovered by him, he is a trustee for the remainderman
as to the excess of the amount received over the value of his life
interest. The Rhode Island court in Sampson v. Grogan said,
"If a policy is issued to a life tenant for the full value of the fee,
and this amount is recovered by him, he certainly ought to be
held to be a trustee for the remainderman as to the excess of the
amount received over the value of his life interest."
This expression is modified by the following statement of the court, "In
the case at bar, however, the declaration does not allege that the
policy covered anything more than the life tenant's interest in
the building which was destroyed by fire." Whether the court
actually lays down the rule attributed to it by Clark v. Leverett
is immaterial for the purposes of this discussion. The language
2 21 R. 1. 174,
350 S. C. 514,
4 151 Pa. 607,
5 159 Ga. 487,

42 A. 712, 44 L. R. A. 711.
27 S. E. 952, 62 Am. St. Rep. 846.
25 A. 142, 31 Am. St. Rep. 786.
126 S. E. 258, 37 A. L. R. 180.
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first quoted does, in any event, expose a possible doctrine midway
between that of Massachusetts and of South Carolina, the next
to be considered.
The third rule, designated the South Carolina rule, is laid
down in the Green case relied on by the remainderman in the
principal case. The South Carolina court holds that the funds
collected on the policy stand in the place of the property destroyed and should therefore be used in rebuilding it, or should
be held by the life tenant as a fund, the interest from which
would be his during his life, the principal of which would go to
the remainderman upon the tenant's death.
We have, then, three doctrines: First, that of Massachusetts,
which holds that the life tenant may insure for the full value,
and, after a recovery on the policy following a loss of the property, he need not account to the remainderman for any portion,
even though the proceeds exceed the value of his interests. Second, that of Rhode Island, which holds that the amount in excess
of the value of his interest must be kept in trust for the remainderman. Third, that of South Carolina, which holds that the
entire proceeds take the place of the property and are held in
trust for the remainderman with the income going to the life
tenant until the natural termination of the life estate.
The exact question has not come up in many states, but where
it has, the majority of the courts have held to the Massachusetts
doctrine. In Spalding v. Miller,6 a Kentucky case decided in
1898-although it was admitted that the life tenant had insured
for, and recovered, more than the value of his interest-held
there was no trust relationship, that the fund did not take the
place of the property, and that the remainderman had no interest whatever in the money. The South Carolina cases were
referred to and considered, but the court did not regard them as
expressing sound law. Three years later this Kentucky case was
approved in Saunders v. Armstrong.7
In Brownell v. Board of Education,8 the Court of Appeals of
New York decided that where the vendor of an executory contract for the sale of certain chattels insured them in his own
name and for his own benefit, he was entitled to keep the proceeds of the insurance if a loss occurred before delivery and
passing of title to the chattels. The suit was brought by the
vendee of the contract, who was held to have no interest in the
103 Ky. 405, 45 S. W. 462.
22 Ky. L. 1789, 61 S. W. 700.
8239 N. Y. 369, 146 N. E. 630.
6

7
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money. The Supreme Court of New York, in a case on all fours
with our principal case, held that the remainderman had no
interest in the insurance money and could not make the life
tenant use the funds to rebuild the house which had been detroyedf
The Supreme Court of Oregon was called upon to decide the
point in Miller v. Gold Beach Packing Company,10 where the
defendant was a lessee under a fifteen-year lease, containing a
covenant that all buildings erected on the premises should be
left there by the tenant and should become the property of the
'lessor at the termination of the lease. A building constructed
and insured for its full value by the tenant was destroyed by
fire, and a recovery was made on the policy. It was held that
the covenant to leave the buildings on the premises did not
extend to include rebuilding them in case of destruction by fire,
and therefore the reversioner could not recover any part of the
insurance money. The Oregon court cites the Brownell case
in New York and approves its reasoning and its decree.
Virginia also is a state which can be said to support the
Massachusetts, and majority, rule. In Thompson v. Gearhart,"
the defendant had been in possession under a life estate for the
life of another person and had insured the buildings in his own
name. The party by whose lifetime the defendant's estate was
limited, died, and thereafter a loss of the buildings occurred.
The insured, of course, was not rightfully entitled to recover
on the policy which was not in force after the termination of the
life tenancy, but nevertheless, a judgment was recovered against
the insurance company. The remainderman was allowed no
share in the proceeds. The court rested its decision exclusively
on the one ground that the contract of insurance was one of
personal indemnity only and therefore the remainderman had no
rights whatever, even though the loss occurred after the termination of the preceding particular estate and when the remainderman had the right of possession.
The Illinois Supreme Court has not had the issue between life
tenant and remainderman before it for decision, but, in a suit
by a life tenant against an insurance company, it has decided
that the tenant could recover for the entire loss, even though
that loss exceeded the value of the tenant's interest.1 2 The
Illinois Appellate Court had a case of remainderman against
9 Addis et a]. v. Addis et al., 14 N. Y. S. 657.
10 131 Or. 302, 282 P. 764, 66 A. L. R. 858.
11 137 Va. 427, 119 S. E. 67, 35 A. L. R. 36.
12 The Andes Insurance Co. v. Henry Fish, 71 111. 620.
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life tenant in Home Insurance Company v. Field,3 where an
instruction had been given in the trial court that it was the duty
of the life tenant to preserve the buildings on the property, so
that the heir would not be deprived of the inheritance. The
charge was held to be erroneous; and, the court, after stating
that a widow's homestead was a life estate, said, "Nor do we
understand that the law imposes upon a widow having an estate
of homestead, the duty and obligation of preserving the buildings
by insurance against fire, and of applying money received from
such insurance to the rebuilding of the house, so that the heir
shall not be deprived of the inheritance."
Harrison v. Pepper,14 wherein the majority rule is laid down,
has its foundation in two earlier cases in Massachusetts. In the
first of these decisions, an attachment creditor obtained insurance on the attached property. A loss occurred, and it was held
that the creditor was not bound to apply to his claim the amount
of the insurance money he collected. 15 The second case was that
of Burlingame v. Goodspeed et al.16 Goodspeed, the agent of
one Reed, a creditor of Burlingame, applied to the debtor for a
trust deed as security for his principal's debt. The deed was
given and Goodspeed, the agent, was named as trustee. Goodspeed, by virtue of the legal title vested in him, then insured
the property, the policy insuring "H. C. Goodspeed, for account
of whom it may concern; loss, if any, payable to him."
An
amount much in excess of the debt was collected on the policy,
and the suit was brought by the debtor to have the debt paid
out of the proceeds. The court found no duty on the trustee to
insure for the mortgagor's benefit, and, therefore, the premium
on the insurance was not a debt that the mortgagor could have
been forced to pay, and hence he ought not in equity get the
benefit of the insurance. These two cases form a firm basis of
authority in Massachusetts for the rule in Harrison v. Pepper.
The so-called "Rhode Island rule" has no authority to support
it, if in fact there is such a rule. As has been previously observed, the case of Sampson v. Grogan does not actually lay
down the rule attributed to it by the Georgia court in Clark v.
Leverett. The Rhode Island court expressed the opinion that
the life tenant ought to be held as a trustee for the amount of
the insurance money in excess of the value of his interest, but
it also held that in the case before it there was no allegation that
13 42 Ill. App. 392.
14 166 Mass. 288, 44 N. E. 222, 33 L. R. A. 239, 55 Am. St. Rep. 404.

15 International Trust Co. v. Boardman, 149 Mass. 158, 21 N. E. 239.
16 153 Mass. 24, 26 N. E. 232.
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the money collected exceeded the value of the life tenant's interest and therefore dismissed the bill. An examination of other
cases often supposed to have adopted this rule will also be found
to fall short of supporting it. Thus, Michigan was at one time
thought to adhere to this doctrine, by virtue of its decision in
Convis et al. v. Citizens' Mutual Fire Insurance Company of
Calhoun County et al.,17 where the proceeds of the policy were
divided by a court of equity between life tenant and remainderman, the former being allotted the amount equal to the value of
his interest and the latter receiving the excess. But the facts
were that the life tenant had expressly agreed to insure for both
parties and the court was merely carrying into effect the agreement and making the tenant do what he had bound himself to do.
A later decision in Michigan was cited as authority for the South
Carolina doctrine in Clark v. Leverett, but again special circumstances distinguish the case, for there the relationship of
guardian and ward existed between the remainderman and life
tenant.' 8 Bennett v. Featherstone,19 a Tennessee case, is typical
of those cases in which the life tenant insured only his life
interest. The remainderman was held to have no interest. In
the cases where the life tenant insures only his interest, it is not
necessary for the court to inquire into the respective rights of
life tenant and remainderman, because, until the life tenant's
interest is satisfied, the remainderman has no rights.
The minority rule finds little support in authority. South
Carolina appears to be the only state squarely committed to the
doctrine that the life tenant must account for all of the insurance proceeds and that the money takes the place of the property destroyed. The root of the doctrine is found in Smith v.
Daniel.20 A bill had been filed to make the defendant life tenant
give security for protection of the remainderman's interest in a
slave. It was held that the facts did not warrant a decree
compelling security to be given, although in a proper case such
relief might well be granted. These words appear in the opinion,
"A tenant for life is considered in the nature of a trustee for
those in remainder." In the cases which follow Smith v. Daniel,
this language has been made to say that the life tenant is a
trustee for the remainderman, not that he is merely considered
in the nature of a trustee; and, in the case mentioned as finally
laying down the South Carolina rule, Green v. Green, it is held
that the life tenant occupies the position of trustee and the remainderman that of cestui que trust.
17 127 Mich. 616, 86 N. W. 994.

Smith v. Cameron, 158 Mich. 174, 122 N. W. 564.
19 110 Tenn. 27, 71 S. W. 589.
20 2 McCord's Ch. (S. C.) 143, 16 Am. Dec. 641.
18
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Clark v. Leverett cannot strictly be said to follow the South
Carolina doctrine, for there the relationship of guardian and
ward existed, with the life tenant occupying the position of
guardian of the remainderman, who was a minor, and by virtue
of a statute in Georgia the guardian was a trustee for his ward.
So, although the court claims to be following the Green case,
these special circumstances made it unnecessary to declare that
a trust existed from the naked relationship of life tenant and
remainderman, as the South Carolina court expressly decides.
Having reviewed the authorities declaring and supporting the
various doctrines and having found that where there is authority,
it exists in favor of the Massachusetts rule, it remains to consider which of the doctrines has the best basis in reason and can
therefore be upheld on principle.
Since we have here a question of insurance, it is necessary to
call attention to the nature of fire insurance. A contract of fire
insurance is one of indemnity which any person may effect on
property where its destruction would result in loss to the person
insuring.21 It is a personal contract and cannot be transferred
by the insured without the insurer's consent. 22 It does not run
with the land 23 nor do the proceeds of the policy take the place
of the property destroyed. 24 A person may not insure for more
than the value of the property, but the parties may agree as to
the value of the property, and in the absence of fraud, actual or
presumptive, 25 the agreed value is binding.2 6 Applying these
principles to our case, we find the life tenant had a right to insure
his own interest because he would have suffered a loss if the
property was destroyed. We see also that the contract was
personal to the life tenant, not to replace the property, but to
indemnify him by the payment of a sum of money in the event
21 Berry v. American Century Insurance Co. of St. Louis, 132 N. Y. 49, 30
N. E. 254; The Andes Insurance Co. v. Henry Fish, 71 111. 620; Prussian National Insurance Co. v. Lawrence, 221 Fed. 931, L. R. A. 1915 E. 489.
22 Kase v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 58 N. J. Law 34, 32 A. 1057; William
R. Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance, (2d ed.) p. 70, and cases cited.
23 Carpenter v. The Providence Washington Insurance Co., 16 Pet. 495, 10
L. Ed. 1044.
24 Oldham's Trustee v. Boston Insurance Co., 189 Ky. 844, 226 S. W. 106,
16 A. L. R. 305.
25 See Lycoming Fire Insurance Co. v. Rubin, 79 1l. 402, where a jeweler
took out a $3,000 policy on goods worth not over $1,500. The court held there
was a sufficient presumption of fraud to avoid the policy. To the same effect
is American Insurance Co. v. Gilbert, 27 Mich. 429.
26 Borden v. Hingham Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 35 Mass. 523, s9 Am. Dec.
614, and note 616; Patapsco Insurance Co. v. Biscoe, 7 Gill and J. (Md.) 212,
28 Am. Dec. 219; Phoenix Insurance Co. v. McLoon, 100 Mass. 475.
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of loss. The effect of the ten thousand dollar valuation in the
policy is to limit the liability of the insurance company in case
the property was worth more than that amount and to make
that valuation, unless fraudulently excessive, bind them in the
event of a total destruction.
The existence of these principles and the weight of these conclusions was recognized by the insurance company in paying the
full value of the policy. Thus far there is no difficulty. But
what is their application to the relationship of life tenant and
remainderman? As to the portion of the proceeds up to the
value of the life tenant's interest there can be little said. It is
clear that the life tenant is entitled to that portion and that the
South Carolina rule is in effect a denial of the personal character
of the insurance contract. A more difficult question is presented as to the amount in excess of the tenant's interest. The
result of the Massachusetts rule that this excess also belongs to
the tenant, is this: The life tenant, now having a sum of money
which is equal to the full value of the property, could build a
house of his own on land in which he would have not merely a
life interest, but the fee title, in which the remainderman has
no interest. It is this result that the South Carolina court has
sought to avoid. The Rhode Island rule attempts to avoid this
result and at the same time recognize the right of the tenant to
the prooceds up to the value of his interest.
Viewed in the light of the insurance principles mentioned, the
rule giving the entire proceeds to the tenant is not as harsh as
it seems at first glance. The contract is personal and for the
tenant's own benefit. The parties have agreed as to value and
the premiums have been based on that valuation and have been
paid by the life tenant out of his own pocket. We must keep
in mind the fact that the money does not take the place of the
property destroyed but is pure indemnity to the person taking
out the insurance contract. The remainderman is a stranger to
that contract.
This brings us to a consideration of the contract question.
We have just said the remainderman is a stranger to the contract, but may he not have rights under the contract as a thirdparty beneficiary? It is elementary contract law that a third
27
party has no rights under a contract unless made for his benefit.
The United States Supreme Court in discussing the suit on a
contract by a third person has stated the law thus :28 "What27 Crandall v. Payne, 154 11l. 627; Parker v. Jeffery, 26 Or. 186, 37 P. 712;
Searles v. City of Flora, 225 Il. 167.
28 Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721.
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ever may be the correct theory, one thing is essential to the right
and that is that the third person be the real promisee-that the
promise be made to him in fact although not in form. It is not
enough that the contract may operate to his benefit. It must
appear that the parties intend to recognize him as the primary
party in interest and as privy to the promise." An affirmative
answer to the question would involve the making of some new
contract law, unless it is presumed that the contract of insurance was made for the remainderman's benefit. Such a presumption would be a pure fiction, since it must be clear that neither
the life tenant nor the insurance company gave any thought to
the remainderman when making the contract.
The minority rule disregards this contract ground by saying
that without regard to the intention of the contracting parties,
the life tenant owed a duty to the remainderman to insure for his
benefit, arising out of their relationship, and that whether intended for the remainderman's benefit or not, the contract will
be so regarded. This leads us to a consideration of the relationship between life tenant and remainderman with respect to the
duty of preservation of the property. What is the duty of the
life tenant; is he bound absolutely to see that the property is
preserved so that the remainderman may have the enjoyment of
it?
In seeking a decision which compels the tenant to replace
buildings destroyed during his tenancy by no fault of his own,
we find that even South Carolina refuses so to hold in a case
29
where the property had deteriorated from natural causes.
But, to be consistent, it must be said that where there is no duty
to replace, there can be no duty to insure, because the South
Carolina rule rests upon the proposition that the insurance
money takes the place of the property destroyed.
Another approach is to inquire into the results of a failure
to insure under the South Carolina doctrine. Again, to be consistent, the court would have to hold the tenant guilty of negligence for not insuring the property, since it is his duty to do so
under the rule, and a breach of the duty would be actionable
negligence if damage resulted. Such a state of the law would
render covenants to insure meaningless and unnecessary, for
the tenant would be bound to insure regardless of covenant and
liable personally if he failed to do so. Because the life tenant
would be bound to protect him a remainderman would always
be foolish if he insured in his own interest.
29 Brooks v. Brooks, 12 S. C. 422.
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Again, looking at a failure of the tenant to insure as waste,
we find the minority rule squarely opposed to well settled prin0
ciples of law. In Cannon v. Barry,3
in describing the conduct
of a life tenant who had allowed a dwelling house to lose its
value completely by decay, the court said, "He has been guilty
of permissive waste in suffering the mansion to go to decay, but
courts of equity take no jurisdiction of permissive waste by a
life tenant. Their constant interference in such matters would
render the enjoyment of the life estate impossible." It is apparent that the statement that it is the duty of the life tenant
to insure for the remainderman has no basis in law and does
not arise from the naked relationship between them.
One other ground for the minority rule has been urged in
the South Carolina cases. It is said that it is against public
policy to allow the tenant to insure for more than the value of
his interest. We previously touched briefly on this question of
overvaluation and called attention to the fact that where the
insured and insurer agree as to value, the agreement, in the
absence of fraud, is conclusive. This rule is itself based on consideration of public policy, that of not allowing an insurance
company to avoid a policy after loss, where it previously agreed
as to value. In any event, that question is one between the
insurance company and the life tenant and has absolutely no
force as to the remainderman.
The Massachusetts rule is without doubt the soundest of the
three doctrines. While the result at which the other rules arrive may in one way be said to be equitable in that the remain
derman does not lose anything by the destruction of the property, and in so far as the life tenant is given the use of the fund
for life, and so is in as good a position as before the fire, nevertheless, the conclusion must be that the Mississippi court was
on firm ground in following the Massachusetts rule and the
weight of authority. The end does not justify the means, and to
arrive at their result the South Carolina and Rhode Island
courts, as we have observed, have disregarded many well-established legal principles of insurance, contracts, and real property
law.
ANNULMENT

OF MARRIAGE FOR FRAUD

IN THE INDUCEMENT.-

May a court of equity annul a marriage upon the ground that
there has been a breach of a contract, entered into before marriage, by which the wife promised the plaintiff sufficient money.
to carry on a certain business enterprise? The recent decision
in the case of Shonfeld v. Shonfeld' concedes it that right.
30 59 Miss. 289.
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Harry E. Shonfeld, the plaintiff, had been keeping company
for some years prior to his marriage with the defendant, Bessie
Shonfeld. Whenever marriage had been discussed by the defendant, the plaintiff had stated that lie was in no position to
marry because he could not make a living. When in May, 1930,
the subject again arose, the defendant suggested that if it were
only a matter of sufficient money to establish him in a business
of his own, she could provide it. A month later six thousand
dollars was needed to establish the plaintiff in a jewelry business.
Defendant refused to furnish any money before marriage. In
July of that year plaintiff and defendant contracted a civil marriage, after which the plaintiff requested the money promised
him. When defendant refused, plaintiff discovered that she did
not have it nor had even the means of getting it.
Plaintiff, claiming that the representations thus made were
false, were believed and relied upon, and induced his consent to
the marriage, then filed a bill to annul it. The trial court denied
relief on the ground that the representations did not go to the
essence of the marriage contract. The appellate division affirmed the trial court. The Court of Appeals by a four to three
decision reversed that of the appellate division and decreed
annulment of the marriage.
American courts have, in general, treated marriage as a contract so distinguished from other contracts that the fraud which
would vitiate it would have to be of the kind that goes to the
very essentials of the marriage relation-the rights and duties
connected with cohabitation and consortium attached by law to
the marital status. Using that as a standard, representations as
to anything else not within its limits would be a representation
as to an incidental characteristic of the relation and would not
be material in affecting the status.
The origin of this view is found in England, ,here the jurisdiction of matrimonial cases was in the ecclesiastical courts.
Governed by the Biblical injunction, the courts were chary of
adding to causes which would be sufficient to sever the parties.
The fundamental of initial consent was recognized, however,
and it was said by authority, "Persons cannot become husband
and wife without their mutual consent. Consent is the very
1260 N. Y. 477, 184 N. E. 60 (1933), reversing 258 N. Y. S. 338; commented
upon in 32 Col. L. Rev. 1240; 2 Brooklyn L. Rev. 124-6; 46 Harv. L. Rev.
L. Rev. 124-5; 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
1034-5; 7 St. Johns L. Rev. 301-6; 28 Ill.
128-32; 7 U. Cin. L. Rev. 338-40; 18 Corn. L. Quart. 97-101; 10 N. Y. U.
L. Q. Rev. 247-8.
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essence of the marriage contract; without it the marriage is null
and void.''2 Fraud in the execution of the agreement vitiated
the consent and rendered the marriage contract a nullity. Fraud
as to facts inducing consent was not alone suffeient. Where a
question came up as to false representations of pedigree, Lord
Stowell said, "A man who means to act upon such representations should verify them by his own inquiries; the law presumes
that he uses due caution in a matter in which his happiness for
life is so materially involved, and it makes no provision for the
relief of a blind credulity, however it may have been produced.' '8
4
The American authorities purported to follow the English,
but apparently took a step beyond the latter in holding fraud in
the inducement as grounds for annulment if the fraud went to
the essentials of the marriage. Massachusetts stated its position
in the key case of Reynolds v. Reynolds: 5 "In the absence of
force or duress, and where there is no mistake as to the identity
of the person, any error or misapprehension as to personal traits
or attributes, or concerning the position or circumstances in life
of a party, is deemed wholly immaterial and furnishes no good
cause for divorce. . . These are accidental qualities which do
not constitute the essential and material elements on which the
marriage relation rests. . . . Nothing can then avoid it [the
marriage] which does not amount to fraud in the essentialia of
the marriage relation. Iowa, Delaware, Illinois, Ohio, South
Carolina, Washington, and New York-before 1903, and in some
cases, after-also followed the conservative theory. Thus, annulment was not permitted except in such cases as misrepresentations as to pregnancy,0 venereal diseases,7 and impotency or
sterility.8 Misrepresentations as to love, 9 intention not to assume
the marriage relation,' 0 physical condition," disease other than
2 2 Kent's Comm. 76.77; Countess of Portsmouths case, 1 Hagg. Eccl. Rep.
355; Moot v. Moot, 37 Hun 288.
3 Wakefield v. Mackay, 1 Hagg. Con. 394, 1 Phill. Eccl. 134n.
4 For English view see Moss v. Moss, [1897] Prob. 263, 66 L. J. P. 154.
5 3 Allen (85 Mass.) 605 at page 607. For a discussion of the problem raised
in this case see Fessenden, "Nullity of Marriage," 13 Harv. L. Rev. 110.
6 Reynolds v. Reynolds, 85 Mass. 605.
7 Smith v. Smith, 171 Mass. 404, 50 N. E. 933, 41 L. R. A. 800, 68 Am.
St. Rep. 440; C. v. C., 158 Wis. 301, 148 N. W. 865, 5 A. L. R. 1013; Ryder
v. Ryder, 66 Vt. 158, 28 A. 1029, 44 Am. St. Rep. 833.
8 The Inhabitants of the Town of Gilford v. The Inhabitants of the Town
of Oxford, 9 Conn. 321; Turney v. Avery, 92 N. J. Eq. 473, 113 A. 710. See
16 Col. L. Rev. 525.
9 Griffin v. Griffin, 205 N. Y. S. 131.
10 Bannon v. Bannon, 50 Wash. L. Rep. (Dist. of Col.) 22, 23 A. L. R.
178; Johnson v. Johnson, 257 Ill. App. 587.
11 Kraus v. Kraus, 6 Ohio (N. P.) 248.
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venereal, 12 chastity, 13 rank, wealth and fortune,' 4 character, 15
name or past life,' 6 have been held in jurisdictions following
Massachusetts as insufficient cause.
Before 1903, New York stated its position in this fashion:
"The rule is well settled that no fraud will avoid a marriage
which does not go into the very essence of the contract and which
is not in its nature such a thing as either would prevent the
party from entering into the marriage relation, or, having entered into it, would preclude performance of the duties which
the law imposes upon the husband and wife as a party to that
contract. ' 17
Ever since the equity courts in this country assumed jurisdiction exercised formerly by the church courts, the reformers have
protested that the courts treated the marriage relation too
lightly. Such is not true, however; the marriage status has been
jealously protected and the courts, in invoking the power to sever
the parties, have always considered that the fraud which may
dissolve the marriage must be as to something vital. Parties to
it take each other for better and for worse, and fraud in respect
to character, fortune, health, and the like have been considered
as not material enough to invalidate the marriage. Yet, concepts
of marriage have changed with the times. "The mores determine what marriage shall be, who may enter into it, in what way
they may enter it, divorce, and all the details of proper conduct
in the family relation. 1's
The importance to the marriage relation of character and health deserves to be considered, lest the
doctrine which would deny annulment in cases of deception as to
small details, usually termed "incidentals," be extended to
greater considerations affecting the happiness of the relationship.
Fairness has been demanded in dealings in this relationship as
well as in other contracts, and the tendency has been to consider
the marriage contract as one, which, by virtue of its duration
12

Lyon v. Lyon, 230 Ill. 366, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 996.

13 Hedden v. Hedden, 21 N. J. Eq. 61; Leavitt v. Leavitt, 13 Mich. 452;
Hull v. Hull, 191 Il. App. 307.
14 Williams v. Williams, 32 Del. 39; Allen's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 196, 44 Am.
Rep. 101; Woodward v. Heichelbech, 97 N. J. Eq. 257, 128 A. 169.
15 Weir v. Still, 31 Iowa 107.
16 Chipman v. Johnston, 237 Mass. 502, 130 N. E. 65, 14 A. L. R. 119, where
the court said that false representations by a man to a woman as to his name,
place of residence and situation in life made with a view fraudulently to procure her marriage to him, will not warrant the annulment of a marriage brought
about by such representations. Case discussed in 19 Mich. L. Rev. 881-2.
17 Fisk v. Fisk, 39 N. Y. S. 537 (1896).
Is Vanneman, "Annulment of Marriage for Fraud," 9 Minn. L. Rev. 497.
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and all-inclusiveness, should be attended in its inception with
more than usual precautions.
This growth, however, has been slow and in keeping with the
traditional policy of the law to change only as the times change
permanently. The early cases in New York which have been
cited by recent decisions and dicta declared that marriage was
more than a contract, that it was more particularly a status, of
which the marriage contract was merely the inception. But the
trend of decisions in New York was declared to be codified in the
Domestic Relations Law' 9 upon
which was based the decision in
20
Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo.
In that case, the woman represented to the man with whom
she had been having intercourse that he was the father of a
child born to her while he was away from the state, and she exhibited to him a child when he returned. She had not given
birth to any child, but had procured one for the purpose. It
was decided that the woman had practiced a gross fraud in order
to be married. The court held, under the statute, that such
representations induced consent to a civil contract; such consent
was therefore secured by fraud which vitiated the contract. The
court said, "We rely upon the plain provisions of our statute
and upon the application to the case of a contract of marriage of
those salutary and fundamental rules which are applicable to
contracts generally when determining their validity. If the
plaintiff proves to the satisfaction of the court that through
misrepresentations of some fact which was an essential element
in the giving of his consent to the contract of marriage and
which was of such a nature as to deceive an ordinarily prudent
person, he has been victimized and the court is empowered to
annul the marriage."
The trend as to the degree of fraud is materially changed by
this decision. Fraud, material to the degree that, had it not
been practiced, the party deceived would not have consented to
the marriage, and of such a nature as to deceive an ordinarily
prudent person, is now considered adequate without further
definition or limitation.
The New York courts have held that the following were material in each case and were grounds for annulment: misrepresentations as to tuberculosis 21 and epilepsy;22 false statements
19 Ch. 14 Paragraph 10 of N. Y. Cons. Laws ("marriage continues to be a
civil contract").
20 174 N. Y. 467, 67 N. E. 63, 63 L. R. A. 92 (1903).
21 Sobol v. Sobol, 150 N. Y. S. 248.
22 McGill v. McGill, 163 N. Y. S. 462. (Case reversed on newly discovered
facts in 166 N. Y. S. 397 rather than on principle of law).
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made by the defendant about non-essential things ;23 concealment
of mental disorders in the family 24 and an intention never to
assume marital relations; 25 misrepresentations as to use of
27
drugs, 20 the offer to contribute money with intent to defraud,

a former marriage, 28 honesty, 29 intentions not to carry out marriage agreements, 30 misrepresentations as to chastity,3 1 as to former marriage and annulment, 32 as to citizenship, 33 as to threats

of revelations about former indiscretions,3 4 and as to securing of
religious ceremony after civil.8 5

In the instant case, the authority to annul a marriage in New
York, while an equitable remedy in its nature, is purely statutory. 36 Marriage in New York represents merely a civil contract
in its inception which later ripens into a status.3 7 As a civil contract alone the essentials of marriage are consent and capacity
to give it. 3 8 If either party consents through fraud, there is no
reality of consent. Chancellor Sandford said in Ferlat v.
Gojon39 that in England the ecclesiastical courts had cognizance
of matrimonial causes, but the jurisdiction of equity in cases of
fraudulent contracts was sufficiently comprehensive to include
Libman v. Libman, 169 N. Y. S. 900.
Smith v. Smith, 184 N. Y. S. 134.
25 Moore v. Moore, 157 N. Y. S. 819.
20 O'Connell v. O'Connell, 194 N. Y. S. 265.
27 Robert v. Robert, 150 N. Y. S. 366, where the complainant was induced
to marry the defendant by his misrepresentation that they would put their
money together and buy a hotel, and it appeared that the defendant had never
any intention of carrying out his declared intention.
(Dicta, the case going
28 Minner v. Minner, 238 N. Y. 529, 144 N. E. 781.
as to the status theory).
29 Sheridan v. Sheridan, 186 N. Y. S. 470.
30 Moore v. Moore, 157 N. Y. S. 819.
31 Domschke v. Domschke, 122 N. Y. S. 892.
32 Weill v. Weill, 172 N. Y. S. 589.
23

24

33 Truiano v. Truiano, 201 N. Y. S. 573, discussed in 24 Col. L. Rev. 433,
8 Minn. L. Rev. 341, and 33 Yale L. Jour. 793.
84 Warren v. Warren, 199 N. Y. S. 856.

Rubinson v. Rubinson, 181 N. Y. S. 28.
30 Walter v. Walter, 217 N. Y. 439, 111. N. E. 1081; Bays v. Bays, 174 N.
Y. S. 212.
37 Lapides v. Lapides, 254 N. Y. 76, 171 N. E. 911, which approves of the
"status" theory.
88 Ch. 14 Par. 10 N. Y. Cons. Laws; Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N. Y. 477,
184 N. E. 61.
39 1 Hopk. Ch. 478, 14 Am. Dec. 554.
35
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the contract of marriage.40 As equity refuses to define the fraud
which will be necessary to invalidate a marriage, the courts have
a free hand to decide each case as it appears. The fraud must
be that which concerns giving consent to the marriage so that,
but for the fraud, such consent would not have been given. This
represents the background for the authority of the court, as set
forth by the statutory interpretation which has been given.
Justice Crouch, with that as a basis, takes a further step and
one over which the real controversy arises. He says, "The
obligation of a husband to support a wife is no less lightly to
be entered into than the other obligations of the marital relation
. . . . The business which defendant's mythical money was to
establish was plaintiff's only prospect of supporting her. It was
a definite statement of an existing fact without which, as defendant clearly understood, no marriage was presently practicable. '"41 As such misrepresentation was the inducement for
the giving of the consent, a clear case is presented of fraud,
material to a degree that, had it not been practiced, the party
deceived would not have consented to the marriage.
While it is true that the courts have, as a general practice,
followed the rule that the fraud which will be good ground for
annulment must be as to something which goes to the essentials,
it is impossible to define with any exactness the meaning of that
term. Perhaps our understanding of the term will be determined by the degree to which we consider marriage as a sacrament on the one hand or purely a civil contract on the other.
The recent tendency in some states seems to be away from the
concept of marriage as a sacrament. It was said in Gatto v.
Gatto:42 "The public policy of this state, evidenced by the
statutes, the decisions, or the general consensus of opinion, does
not regard a fraudulent marriage ceremony as sacred and irrevocable by judicial action; it does not encourage the practice of
fraud in such cases by investing a formal marriage, entered
into in consequence of deceit, with all the force and validity of
an honest marriage. While marriage is a contract attended
with many important and peculiar features in which the state is
interested, and while it is one of the fundamental elements of
social welfare, its transcendent importance would seem to demand that wily and designing people should find it difficult
successfully to perpetrate fraud and deceit as inducements to
Bays v. Bays, 174 N. Y. S. 212; Fisk v. Fisk, 39 N. Y. S. 537.
Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N. Y. 477, 184 N. E. 62.
42 79 N. H. 177, 106 A. 493.
40
41
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the marriage relation, rather than that such base attempts should
be regarded as of trivial importance and be wholly disregarded
by the court."
The attitude of the courts on the question as to the sufficiency
of the fraud necessary to annul a marriage can be divided into
three groups: first, English decisions, the oldest and closest akin
to the religious views of the jurists, forming the strict doctrine;
second, those American decisions following the English rule, as
typified by Massachusetts; and, third, the modern liberal rule
as presented in the New York decisions.
No doubt the decision in the Shonfeld case will be discussed
by many as an example of the definition of an appellate court
as that which reviews the errors of a lower tribunal in order to
perpetuate its own. Yet, the opinion is a natural step in the
development of the contractual theory of marriage in New York
and other states. It is clear that the New York courts are only
following the tendency of that state as expressed in the Domestic
Relations Law. To consider this case apart from the statute is
impossible, and so the contractual theory must be firmly anchored
to it. It it said that the intention of the legislature must be
read into every statute. Can there be any doubt in view of the
decisions that the statute has been followed?
It is true that one criticism, that which is raised to any liberal
theory, will be raised to the New York theory. The followers
of the old rule will still say "Man proposes, but God disposes"
to this idea, and will wait in resignation for the licentious and
irregular social relationships which, they claim, will result from
allowing the marital ties to be so easily severed. However, it is
perhaps better to put marriage on a healthier basis in its inception and consider it as a contract to which the parties owe equal
obligations, than to maintain it in a rarified atmosphere of sentiment which, after all, lasts but to the door of the divorce court.

